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We examine a monetary economy where households incur ﬁxed transactions costs when exchanging
bonds and money and, as a result, carry money balances in excess of current spending to limit
the frequency of such trades. As only a fraction of households choose to actively trade bonds and
money at any given time, the market is endogenously segmented. Moreover, because households
in our model economy have the ability to alter the timing of their trading activities, the extent of
market segmentation varies over time in response to real and nominal shocks. We ﬁnd that this
added ﬂexibility can substantially reinforce both sluggishness in aggregate price adjustment and
the persistence of liquidity eﬀects in real and nominal interest rates relative to that seen in models
with exogenously segmented markets.
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There is a wealth of empirical research documenting not only the comovement of real and
nominal series at higher frequencies, but what is widely accepted as persistent responses in real
variables following nominal disturbances. We study such comovements using a monetary model
where households face ﬁxed costs of transferring wealth between interest-bearing assets and money.
As a result of these transactions costs, households infrequently access their interest income and carry
money balances in excess of current spending, and participation in asset markets is endogenously
segmented. As is well known, market segmentation implies that open market operations can have
real eﬀects, because they directly involve only a subset of households. Our paper establishes that,
when market segmentation is endogenized in a model where households hold inventories of money,
changes in the fraction of households participating in asset markets can add considerable persistence
to movements in both nominal and real variables.
Our work builds on an important literature that studies monetary policy in models with ex-
ogenously segmented markets.1 As in the work of Grossman and Weiss (1983), Rotemberg (1984),
and Alvarez, Atkeson and Edmond (2003), households in our model economy only periodically ac-
cess the market for interest-bearing assets (broadly interpreted as markets for relatively high-yield
assets) and they carry inventories of money (interpreted to include relatively low yield liquid as-
sets). Nonetheless, our model is closest in spirit to the endogenous segmentation model of Alvarez,
Atkeson and Kehoe (2002) in that heterogeneous households actively choose when to adjust their
portfolios of bonds and money. Our model is distinguished relative to theirs by a distribution of
money that evolves across periods as most households hold money balances exceeding their cur-
rent consumption expenditures. Moreover, as in Alvarez, Atkeson and Edmond (2003), household
spending rates (ratios of the value of current consumption to money holdings) are lowest among
households that have recently transferred wealth held as bonds into money, and they rise with the
time since such a transfer has occurred. In such an environment, a transitory shock to money
growth changes the distribution of money holding across households with diﬀerent spending rates,
which can in turn lead to persistent movements in inﬂation rates.
Unlike exogenous segmentation environments such as Alvarez, Atkeson and Edmond (2003), the
extent of market segmentation varies over time in our model economy, as the fraction of households
choosing to participate in the asset markets responds to changes in the economy’s state. However,
in contrast to the endogenous segmentation model of Chiu (2005), our allowance for idiosyncratic
diﬀerences across households implies that this fraction remains nontrivial over time, as does the
distribution of money. This distinction has important implications for the propagation of nominal
disturbances. Following an open market operation, endogenous changes in the timing of households’
active participation in asset markets can gradualize aggregate price adjustment relative to that in a
model with exogenous market segmentation. Furthermore, such changes can substantially increase
the persistence of liquidity eﬀects in both real and nominal interest rates.2
Endogenizing access to the asset market, and thus allowing for movements in the fraction of
households actively adjusting their nominal balances at any time, implies larger movements in indi-
vidual households’ spending rates following a shock to the money supply. When transactions costs
1See Alvarez, Lucas and Weber (2001) and the references therein.
2One exception to this is the exogenous segmentation model of Williamson (2005), where households are perma-
nently divided into groups with and without access to the asset markets. There, the assumption that households with
(without) such access prefer to trade among themselves in the goods markets delivers a second type of segmentation
that can lead to persistent liquidity eﬀects.
1are high, and thus the mean time between active trades is long, households tend to hold relatively
large inventories of money and have lower average spending rates. If, in addition, the maximum
time between trades is signiﬁcantly longer than is the mean time, households on average return to
the asset markets with substantial remaining balances. We ﬁnd that, in such circumstances, the
persistence in inﬂation that is implied by the exogenous segmentation model is reduced, as house-
holds not currently participating in the asset markets sharply raise their spending rates following
an open market operation. Conversely, when the mean time between asset market trades is not as
long, so that households have higher average spending rates (or when the mean and maximum times
between such trades are similar, so that households on average return to the bond market with
little remaining money), endogenous changes in the distribution of households increase persistence
in the inﬂation response beyond that in the exogenous segmentation model and, moreover, lead to
persistent changes in interest rates.
As in the many studies in monetary economics that have preceded us, several empirical relation-
ships involving money, interest rates and prices motivate our work. First, short-term real interest
rates are negatively correlated with expected inﬂation. Barr and Campbell provide direct evidence
for this using U.K. data involving inﬂation-indexed bonds. Second, VAR studies consistently have
found evidence of liquidity eﬀects; expansionary open market operations appear to reduce short-
term nominal interest rates, at least in the short-run. (See, for example, Leeper, Sims, and Zha
(1996) and Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1999).) Finally, the general price level appears to
adjust slowly to nominal shocks. This ﬁnding is widely supported by the VAR literature as, for ex-
ample, in the studies of Leeper, Sims, and Zha (1996), Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1999),
and Uhlig (2004). Moreover, King and Watson (1996) show that, at business cycle frequencies,
the price level is positively correlated with lagged real output. Additional evidence for the slow
adjustment of the price level, discussed in Alvarez, Atkeson and Edmond (2003), is provided by the
pattern of short-term movements seen between the ratio of money to consumption and velocity.
The correlation between the ratio of money (M2) to consumption (PCE) and the corresponding
measure of velocity is −0.89 for HP-ﬁltered monthly data.
Segmented markets models have already shown promise in addressing aspects of this empirical
evidence. The endogenous segmentation model of Alvarez, Atkeson and Kehoe (2002) succeeds
in generating liquidity eﬀects and in reproducing the negative relation between real interest rates
and anticipated inﬂation. The Alvarez, Atkeson and Edmond (2003) inventory-theoretic model of
money with exogenous segmentation separately delivers sluggish adjustment of the price level, and
hence persistent inﬂation responses to nominal shocks. Drawing upon elements of each of these
frameworks, we develop an endogenous segmentation model of money that simultaneously succeeds
with regard to both sets of regularities. Moreover, as mentioned above, changes in the number of
households choosing to exchange bonds and money can substantially reinforce the eﬀects of mar-
ket segmentation. Following a transitory shock to the money growth rate, such changes prolong
responses in inﬂation and the real interest rate. When shocks to money growth are persistent, they
lead to far more sluggish price adjustment and more persistent liquidity eﬀects in both nominal
and real interest rates. Alternatively, when we examine real shocks with monetary policy following
a Taylor rule, our economy generates persistence in the responses of inﬂation and interest rates
altogether absent under ﬁxed market segmentation. Finally, in versions of our model with endoge-
nous production, we ﬁnd that persistent technology shocks can lead to non-monotone responses in
employment and output.
Finally, our paper oﬀers an independent theoretical contribution in formally establishing how
2the results of Alvarez, Atkeson and Kehoe (2002) may be extended to a model where there are per-
sistent diﬀerences across households. Here, such extension is necessary, because cash-in-advance
constraints do not always bind so that households carry inventories of money, thereby transmit-
ting the eﬀects of temporary idiosyncratic diﬀerences across periods. By assuming a full set of
state-contingent nominal bonds that allow risk-sharing across households, we ensure that these
diﬀerences across households are persistent, but not permanent. Because households must pay
ﬁxed transactions costs to access their bond holdings, the presence of state-contingent bonds in
our economy does not lead to full insurance; households that are ex-ante identical diverge over
time as idiosyncratic realizations of shocks drive diﬀerences in their money and bond holdings.
Nonetheless, we prove that, whenever a heterogeneous group of households enters the bond market
at the same time, all previous diﬀerences among them are eliminated. As a result, our model
economy exhibits limited memory. Exploiting this property, we are able to apply the numerical
approach to solving generalized (S,s) models developed by King and Thomas (forthcoming) in a
setting where the consumption and savings decisions of heterogeneous risk-averse households are
directly inﬂuenced by nonconvex costs. While this approach has been applied previously in solving
models where risk-neutral production units face idiosyncratic ﬁxed costs of adjusting their prices
or factors of production (as in Dotsey, King and Wolman (1999) and Thomas (2002)), this is to
our knowledge the ﬁrst application involving heterogeneity among households.
2M o d e l
We begin with an overview of the model. Thereafter, we proceed to a more formal description
of households’ problems, followed by the description of a ﬁnancial intermediary that sells house-
holds claims contingent on both aggregate and individual states. Next, we show that there is an
equivalent, but more tractable, representation of households’ lifetime optimization problems, given
their ability to purchase such individual-state-contingent bonds alongside the fact that they are
ex-ante identical. Proofs of all lemmas are provided in the appendix.
2.1 Overview
The model economy has three sets of agents: a unit measure of ex-ante identical households,
a perfectly competitive ﬁnancial intermediary, and a monetary authority. Each inﬁnitely-lived
household values consumption in every date of life, with period utility u(c), and it discounts future
utility with the constant discount factor β,w h e r eβ ∈ (0,1). In each period, households receive a
common endowment, y. This endowment varies exogenously over time, as does the growth rate of
the aggregate money supply, μ.D e ﬁning the date t realization of aggregate shocks as st =( yt,μ t),
we denote the history of aggregate shocks by st =( s1,...,s t), and the initial-period probability




Households have two means of saving. First, they have access to a complete set of state-
contingent nominal bonds. These are purchased from a ﬁnancial intermediary described below,
and are maintained in interest-bearing accounts that we will refer to as households’ brokerage
accounts, following the language of Alvarez, Atkeson and Edmond (2003). Next, they also save
using money, which they maintain in their bank accounts and use to conduct trades in the goods
market.3 Households have the opportunity to transfer assets between their two accounts at the
3When allowed to store money in their brokerage accounts, households never do so given positive nominal interest
3start of each period; this occurs after the realization of all current shocks, but prior to any trading
in the goods market. As such, it is expositionally convenient to refer to each period as consisting
of two subperiods that we will term transfer-time and shopping-time, although nothing in the
environment necessitates this approach.
There are three inter-related frictions leading households to maintain money in their bank
accounts. First, as in a standard cash-in-advance environment, households cannot consume their
own endowments. Each household consists of a worker and a shopper, and the worker must trade
the household endowment for money while the shopper is purchasing consumption goods. As a
result, the household receives the nominal value of its endowment, P(st)y
¡
st¢
, only at the end of
the period after current goods trade has ceased.4 We assume that these end-of-period nominal
receipts are deposited across their two accounts, with fraction λ paid into bank accounts and the
remainder into brokerage accounts. Second, as all trades in the goods market are conducted with
money, each household’s consumption purchases are constrained by the bank account balance it
holds when shopping-time begins.
Note that, absent other frictions, each householdw o u l d ,i ne v e r yp e r i o d ,s i m p l ys h i f tf r o mi t s
brokerage account into its bank account exactly the money needed to ﬁnance current consumption
expenditure not covered by the bank account paycheck from the previous period. There is, however,
a third friction that prevents this, leading households to deliberately carry money across periods;
this is the assumption that they must pay ﬁxed costs each time they transfer assets between their
two accounts. Given these ﬁxed costs, households maintain stocks of money to limit the frequency
of their transfers, and they follow generalized (S,s) rules in managing their bank accounts.
Transfer costs are ﬁxed in that they are independent of the size of the transfer; however,
they vary over time and across households. Here, we subsume the idiosyncratic features that
distinguish households directly in their ﬁxed costs by assuming that each household draws its
own current transfer cost, ξ, from a time-invariant distribution H(ξ) at the start of each period.
Because this cost draw inﬂuences a household’s decision of whether to undertake any transfer, and
hence its current consumption and money savings, each household is distinguished by its history
of such draws, ξt =( ξ1,...,ξt), with associated density h
¡
ξt¢
= h(ξ1)···h(ξt). As will be seen
below, households are able to insure themselves in their brokerage accounts through the purchase
of nominal bonds contingent on both aggregate and individual exogenous states.
2.2 Households
At the start of any period, given date-event history
¡
st,ξt¢
, a household’s brokerage account
assets include nominal bonds, B
¡
st,ξt¢
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T h er e m a i n d e r ,t h ep a y c h e c k ,λP(st−1)y
¡
st−1¢
, is deposited into the household’s bank account and
supplements its money savings there from the previous period, A
¡
st−1,ξt−1¢
.G i v e n t h i s s t a r t o f
period portfolio and its current ﬁxed cost, the household begins the period by determining whether
or not to transfer assets across its two accounts. Denoting the household’s start-of-period bank
rates paid on bonds. Thus, we simplify the model’s exposition here by assuming that money is held only in bank
accounts and verify that nominal rates remain positive throughout our results.
4While this worker-shopper arrangement may appear stark in an endowment economy, it is less so if one envisions
that each household’s endowment is one of a unit measure of diﬀerentiated inputs that enter a consumption aggregator















the relevant features of this choice are summarized in the chart below.



















An active household is indicated by z
¡
st,ξt¢











available in its bank account at the start of the current shopping subperiod. Here, the
household’s current ﬁxed cost applies, so P(st)ξt is deducted from its nominal brokerage wealth.




remaining inactive. In that case, it enters into the shopping subperiod with no change to its
start-of-period bank and brokerage account balances.












































































































Equation 3 is the household’s brokerage account budget constraint associated with history ¡
st,ξt¢
, and requires that expenditures on new bonds together with any transfer to the bank
account and associated ﬁxed cost not exceed current brokerage account wealth. Next, the bank
account budget constraint in equation 4 requires that the household’s money balances entering
the shopping subperiod cover its current consumption expenditure and any money savings for
next period.5 Money balances for next period, in (5), are these savings together with the bank
paycheck received after completion of current goods trade. Equation 6 prevents the household




































5from ending current trade with a negative bank balance; thus, taken together with the restriction
in (4), it imposes cash-in-advance on consumption purchases. Finally, in addition to this sequence













dstdξt ≥ 0.( 7 )
Following the approach of Alvarez, Atkeson and Kehoe (2002), we ﬁnd it convenient to model
risk-sharing by assuming a perfectly competitive ﬁnancial intermediary that purchases government
bonds with payoﬀs contingent on the aggregate shock and, in turn, sells to households bonds with
payoﬀs contingent on both the aggregate and individual shocks. In particular, given aggregate









, and it sells them across households as claims contingent on individual transfer costs,























































, the intermediary must purchase suﬃcient
aggregate bonds to cover all individual bonds held against it for that aggregate history. Given
st+1 occurs, fraction h(ξt+1) of the households with history ξt to whom it sells such bonds will
realize that state and demand payment. As shown in Lemma 1 below, the ﬁnancial intermediary’s
zero proﬁt condition immediately implies that the price of any individual bond associated with
(st+1,ξt+1) is simply the product of the price of the relevant aggregate bond and the probability of
an individual household drawing the transfer cost ξt+1.


















By assuming an initial period 0 throughout which households are perfectly identical, we allow
them the opportunity to trade in individual-state-contingent bonds at a time when they have the
same wealth and face the same probability distribution over all future individual histories. In
this initial period, the government has some outstanding debt, B, that is evenly distributed across
households’ brokerage accounts, and it repays this debt entirely by issuing new bonds. Households
receive no endowment, draw no transfer costs and do not value consumption in this initial period.
Rather, they simply purchase state-contingent bonds for period 1 subject to the common initial







6Following the proof of Lemma 1, section B of the appendix shows that the period 0 budget
constraint above can be combined with the sequence of constraints in (3) to yield the following





























































,( 1 1 )
requiring that its current bonds be covered by a combination of new bond sales and the printing of
new money. This sequence of constraints, alongside equilibrium in the money market, immediately
implies that households’ aggregate expenditures on new bonds in any period is exactly the diﬀerence
























tdξt+1dst+1.( 1 2 )
2.3 A risk sharing arrangement
Three aspects of the environment described above may be exploited to simplify our solution for
competitive equilibrium: (i) households are ex-ante identical, (ii) ﬁxed transfer costs are indepen-
dently and identically distributed across households and time and (iii) households have access to a
complete set of state-contingent claims in their brokerage accounts. In this section, we show how
these assumptions allow us to move to a more convenient representation of households’ problems. In
particular, exploiting the common lifetime budget constraint in (10) above, we will move from the
household problem stated in section 2.2 to construct the equivalent problem of an extended family
that manages all households’ bonds in a joint brokerage account, and whose period-by-period deci-
sions regarding bond purchases and account transfers implement the state-contingent lifetime plan
selected by every household. In doing so, we transform our somewhat intractable initial problem
into something to which we can apply the King and Thomas (2005) approach for solving aggregate
economies involving heterogeneity arising due to (S,s) policies at the individual level.
Money as the individual state variable: A complete set of state-contingent claims in
the brokerage account allows individuals to insure their bond holdings against idiosyncratic risk;
these shocks only aﬀect their bank accounts. Alternatively, an individual’s money balance fully
captures the cumulative eﬀect of his history of idiosyncratic shocks. In Lemma 2, we prove that
prior to households’ draws of current transfer costs, all diﬀerences across them as they enter into
any period are fully summarized by their start-of-period money balances.
Lemma 2. Given M
¡
st−1,ξt−1¢













independent of the history ξt−1.
This result is fairly intuitive. Given that each ξ comes from an i.i.d. distribution, a household’s
draw in any given period does not predict its future draws, and thus directly aﬀects only its asset
7transfer decision in that one period. While this certainly aﬀects current shopping-time money
balances, and hence consumption, its only future eﬀect is in determining the money balances with
which the household will enter the subsequent period, given the household’s ability to insure itself
in its brokerage account by purchasing bonds contingent on both aggregate and individual shocks.
In proving this result, we show that the solution to the original household problem from section
2.2, given the lifetime constraint in (10), is identical to the solution of an alternative problem where
households pool risk period-by-period by each committing to pay the economywide average of the
total transfers and associated ﬁxed costs incurred across all active households in every period,
irrespective of the timing and size of their own portfolio adjustments. It is immediate from this
that households’ bond holdings may be modelled as independent of their individual histories ξt.
Thus, within every period, the distinguishing features aﬀecting any household’s decisions can be
summarized entirely by its start-of-period bank balance, M
¡
st−1,ξt−1¢
, and its current transfer
cost, ξt.
Households as members of time-since-active groups: Our next lemma establishes
that, within any period, all households that undertake an account transfer will select both a common
consumption and a common end-of-period bank balance; hence they begin the subsequent period
with the same bank (and brokerage) account balances.

















To understand this result, recall that household brokerage and bank accounts are joined in periods
when they choose to adjust their portfolios, and all are identical when they make their state-
contingent plans in date 0. Given this, in selecting their consumption for such periods, households
equate their appropriately discounted marginal utility of consumption to the multiplier on the
lifetime brokerage budget constraint from (10), which is common to all households. Next, in
selecting what portion of their shopping-time bank balances to retain after consumption (hence their
next-period balances), households equate the marginal utility of their current consumption to the
expected return on a dollar saved for the next period weighted by their expected discounted marginal
utility of next-period consumption. Given common inﬂation expectations and the common current
consumption of active households, this implies that active households also share in common the
same expected consumption for next period. Thus, all currently active households exit this period
and enter the next period with common money holdings.
Note that the results of Lemmas 2 - 3 combine to imply that, within any period, households that
undertake balance transfers all enter shopping-time with the same bank balance, make the same
shopping-time decisions, and then enter the next period as eﬀectively identical. Moreover, of this
group of currently active households, those households that do not undertake an account transfer
again in the next period will continue to be indistinguishable from one another as they enter
shopping-time, and hence will enter the subsequent period with common bank (and brokerage)
account balances, and so forth. In other words, any household that was last active at some
particular date t is eﬀectively identical to any other househo l dl a s ta c t i v ea tt h a ts a m ed a t e . T h i s
is useful in our numerical approach to solving for competitive equilibrium, since it allows us to
move from identifying individual households by their current money holdings to instead identifying
each household as a member of a particular time-since-active group, with all members of any one
such group sharing in common the same start-of-period money balances.
8Given the above results, we may track the distribution of households over time through two
vectors, one indicating the measures of households entering the period in each time-since-active
group, [θj,t], j =1 ,2,..., and the other storing the balances with which members of each of these
current groups exited shopping-time in the previous period, [Aj−1,t−1]. From the latter, the current
start-of-period balances held by members of each group are retrieved as Mjt = Aj−1,t−1+λPt−1yt−1,
where Pt−1 represents the previous period’s price level, and yt−1 the common endowment of the
previous period. Households within any given start-of-period group j that do not pay their ﬁxed
costs move together into the current shopping subperiod with their starting balances Mjt.A c r o s s
all start-of-period groups, those households that do pay to undertake a bank transfer will enter
the current shopping subperiod in time-since-active group 0 with common shopping-time balances,
M0,t, which we refer to as the current target money balances.
Threshold transfer rules: Finally, we establish that households follow threshold policies in
determining whether or not to transfer assets between their brokerage and bank accounts. Specif-
ically, given its start-of-period money balances, each household has some maximum ﬁxed cost that
it is willing to pay to undertake an account transfer and adjust its balances to the current target.










is a convex set bounded below by 0.
As our preceding results imply that all members of any given start-of-period group j are eﬀectively
identical prior to the draws of their current transfer costs, this last result allows convenient determi-
nation of the fractions of each such group undertaking account transfers, and thus the shopping-time
distribution of households. Deﬁne the threshold cost ξT
jt as that ﬁxed cost that leaves any house-
hold in time-since-active group j indiﬀerent to an account transfer at date t. Households in the
group drawing costs at or below ξT
jt pay to adjust their portfolios, while other members of the
group do not. Thus, within each group j, the fraction of its members shifting assets to reach the
current target bank balance is given by αjt ≡ H(ξT
jt). Each such active household undertakes a




A family problem: Collecting the results above, and assuming that aggregate shocks are
Markov, we may re-express the lifetime plans formulated by individual households as the solution
to the recursive problem of an extended family that manages the joint brokerage account of all
households and acts to maximize the equally-weighted sum of their utilities. In each period, given
the starting distribution of households summarized by {θj,A j} and the current price level P,t h e
family selects the fractions of households from each time-since-active group to receive account
transfers, αj, (and hence the distribution of households over time-since-active groups at the start of
next period, θ
0
j), the shopping-time bank balance of each active household, M0, achieved by transfers
from the family brokerage account, as well as the consumption and money savings associated with
members of each shopping-time group, cj and A0
j+1 respectively, to solve the problem in (13) - (19)
below. In solving this problem, the family takes as given the current endogenous aggregate state
K =[ {θj,Aj},P −1y−1,M−1], and it assumes the future endogenous state will be determined by a
mapping z that it also takes as given; K0 = z(K,s). In equilibrium, K0 is consistent with the
family’s decisions.
V ({θj,A j};K,s)=m a x
∞ X
j=1





















≤ M − M−1 +( 1− λ)P−1y−1 (14)
Mj =[ Aj + λP−1y−1],f o rj>0 (15)
Mj ≥ Pcj + A0
j+1,f o rj ≥ 0 (16)
A0





θj (1 − αj) ≥ θ0
j+1,f o rj>0 (19)
Recall from equation 12 that money market clearing in each period requires that the aggregate
of households’ current bonds less their expenditures on new bonds must equal the change in the
aggregate money supply. By imposing this equilibrium condition, we may use equation 14 to
represent the family’s budget constraint requiring that its joint brokerage assets cover all current
transfers to active households and associated ﬁxed costs, as well as all bond purchases for the
next period. Next, equation 15 identiﬁes the start-of-period money balances associated with each
time-since-active group j, and (16)-(17) represent the bank account budget and cash-in-advance
constraints that apply to members of each shopping-time group. Finally, equations 18 - 19 describe
the evolution of households across groups over time. In (18), the total active households (shopping
in group 0) in the current period is the population-weighted sum of the fractions of households
made active from each start-of-period group, and these households move together to begin the next
period in time-since-active group 1. In (19), households in any given time-since-active group j that
are inactive in the current period will move into the next period as members of group j +1 .
3S o l u t i o n
Recall that we imposed money-market clearing in formulating the family’s problem above. As
such, we can retrieve equilibrium allocations as the solution to (13) - (19) by appending to that
problem the goods market clearing condition needed to determine the equilibrium price level taken















.( 2 0 )
Equation 20 simply states that, within each period, the current aggregate endowment must satisfy
total consumption demand across all active and inactive households together with the economywide
ﬁxed costs associated with account transfers.
In the results to follow, we abstract from trend growth in endowments, and we assume that
money supply is increased at rate μ∗ in the economy’s steady-state. Thus, the steady-state is
associated with inﬂation at rate μ∗ and a stationary distribution of households over real balances
described by [θ∗,a∗],w h e r eθ∗ = {θ∗
j} and a∗={a∗
j},w i t haj ≡
Aj
P−1. As any given household
travels outward across time-since-active groups, it ﬁnds its actual real balances for shopping time,
10(a∗
j +y∗)/(1 +μ∗), falling further and further below target shopping balances; thus, the maximum
ﬁxed cost it is willing to pay to undertake an account transfer rises. Given a ﬁnite upper support
on the distribution of ﬁxed transfer costs, this implies that no household will delay activity beyond
some ﬁnite maximum number of periods, which we denote by J. Thus, the two vectors describing
the distribution of households are each of ﬁnite length J. In solving the steady-state of our economy,
we isolate J as that group j by which αj is chosen to be 1.
Having arrived at the time-since-active representation described above, we are now almost in a
position to follow King and Thomas (2005) in applying linear methods to solve for our economy’s
aggregate dynamics local to the deterministic steady-state. Two details remain. First, as the linear
solution does not allow for a changing number of time-since-active groups, we must restrict J to be
time-invariant. Thus, we assume that, for all t, αJ,t =1 , and we then verify that αj,t ∈ (0,1),f o r
j =1 ,...,J−1, is selected throughout our simulations. Second, we assume that, in every date t,a l l
households that enter shopping in time-since-active group J − 1 completely exhaust their money
balances; aJ,t =0 . Given that any such household will undertake an account transfer with certainty
at the start of the next period, this assumption is consistent with optimizing behavior so long as
we verify that nominal interest rates are always positive.6
In parameterizing our model, we set the length of a period to one quarter, and we choose the
steady-state inﬂation rate μ∗ to imply an average annual inﬂation at 3 percent. Period utility is
iso-elastic, u(c)=c1−σ−1
1−σ ,w i t hσ =2 , and we select the subjective discount factorβ to imply an
a v e r a g ea n n u a lr e a li n t e r e s tr a t eo f3 percent. The steady-state aggregate endowment is normalized
to 1, and the fraction of the endowment paid to household bank accounts (which may be interpreted
as household wages) is λ =0 .6, corresponding to labor’s share of output. Holding these parameters
ﬁxed, we will consider several alternative assumptions regarding the distribution of the ﬁxed costs
that cause market segmentation in our model, as we discuss below.
We begin to explore our model’s dynamics in section 4 through a series of examples involving the
response to a money injection that, once observed, is known to be perfectly transitory. There, we
abstract from shocks to the endowment to study the eﬀects of a monetary shock in isolation, and to
isolate those aspects caused by the endogenous changes in the degree of market segmentation that
distinguish our model. We consider each of three examples distinguished only by the distribution of
ﬁxed transfer costs, beginning with a baseline case where this distribution is uniform on the interval
0 to B. There, we set the upper support at B =0 .25 to imply that the maximum time that any
household remains inactive is J =6quarters. For individual households, the result is a 4.82 quarter
average duration between account transfers. In the aggregate, this calibration results in a steady-
state velocity of 1.9, which corresponds to the U.S. average over the past decade.7 In our second
example, we raise the maximum transfer cost to imply an aggregate velocity matching the U.S.
postwar average, at 1.5. Retaining the assumption that transfer costs are distributed uniformly,
this implies a mean household inactivity duration of 7 quarters and a substantially longer maximum
6Given positive nominal rates, if aJ,t > 0 ever were to occur, the family could have improved its welfare by reducing
the target balances given to active households at date t − (J − 1) and increasing its bond purchases at that date to
ﬁnance increased transfers to a subsequent group of active households for whom the non-negativity constraint would
eventually bind.
7For comparability, we follow Alvarez, Atkeson and Edmond (2003) in our measures of money and velocity. As
in their paper, money is broadly deﬁned as the sum of currency, checkable deposits, and time and savings deposits.
They show that the opportunity cost of these assets, relative to short-term Treasury securities, is substantial and, as
aw h o l e ,n o tv e r yd i ﬀerent from that of M1. Next, velocity is computed as the ratio of nominal personal consumption
expenditures to money.
11inactivity spell, at 10 quarters. This large diﬀerence between a household’s average expected period
of inactivity versus the maximum such spell will be seen to have important qualitative implications
for the model’s aggregate dynamics. Thus, in our third example, we will move to consider a more
ﬂexible cost distribution under which aggregate velocity again averages 1.5, but mean and maximum
durations are close at 9.55 and 10 quarters, respectively.
Following our temporary money growth shock examples, we will move in section 5 to examine
the model’s aggregate dynamics under more realistic assumptions about monetary policy. First, we
will consider the response to a persistent rise in the money growth rate. There, we will assume that
money growth follows a mean-zero AR-1 process in logs with persistence 0.57, as consistent with the
ﬁnding of Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2000).8 Next, in a second set of results, we will consider
the response to a persistent shock to the real endowment in an environment where changes in the
rate of money growth are dictated by the monetary authority’s pursuit of speciﬁc stabilization
goals. In that case, the common household endowment will follow a persistent lognormal process,
log(yt)=ρlog(yt−1)+εt,ε∼ n(0,σ2
ε),
with ρ =0 .90 and σε =0 .007, and the monetary authority will follow a Taylor rule in responding
to deviations in inﬂation. In the endowment economy, we assume that the Taylor rule places zero
weight on deviations in output, and is thus:
it = i∗ +1 .5[πt − π∗].
A version of the model with production, where the Taylor rule does respond to changes in output,
is discussed in section 5.3.
4E x a m p l e s
4.1 Steady-state
Before examining its responses to shocks, it is useful to begin with a discussion of household
portfolio adjustment timing in our model’s steady-state. We ﬁrst consider how each of our three
examples relates to the available micro-evidence provided by Vissing-Jørgensen (2002).
Using the Consumer Expenditure Survey, Vissing-Jørgensen computes that the fraction of
households that actively bought or sold risky assets (stocks, bonds, mutual funds and other such
securities), between one year and the next ranges from 0.29 to 0.53 as a function of ﬁnancial
wealth.9 For a direct comparison with each version of our quarterly model, we compute the steady-
state unconditional probability that a household will undertake active trade within one year as
8The persistence of the monetary measure used to calibrate our model is actually substantially higher, at 0.93
over the sample period 1954:1 to 2003:1. Since our results are not qualitatively changed, we use the Chari, Kehoe
and McGrattan M1-based value for comparability.
9The CEX interviews about 4500 households each quarter, and each household is interviewed ﬁve times, with ﬁnan-
c i a li n f o r m a t i o ng a t h e r e di nt h eﬁnal interview only. Vissing-Jørgensen (2002) limits her sample to 6770 households
that held risky assets both at the time of the ﬁfth interview and one year earlier. She ﬁnds that the probabilities
of buying or selling risky assets do not signiﬁcantly change when the sample, spanning 1982 - 1996, is split into
subsamples according to interview dates.
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(θj − θj+4), with θj+4 =0for j>J− 4.10 We ﬁnd that the fraction of households actively
t r a d i n gi na na v e r a g ey e a ri s0.78 in our baseline example, which is quite high relative to the
Vissing-Jørgensen data. This may be explained in part by the fact that the transfer costs in this
example are calibrated to match aggregate velocity over only the past decade, when transactions
costs were presumably lower than in her 1982-1996 sample period. When we instead calibrate to
match aggregate velocity over the postwar period in our second example (with higher transactions
costs), the fraction of households trading annually falls to 0.55, slightly above the empirical range.
Our most successful example with regard to this evidence is the third, where high transactions
costs are drawn from a distribution implying the same postwar aggregate velocity, but longer ex-
pected episodes of inactivity. There, the model predicts an average annual fraction of households
conducting trades well within the empirical range, at 0.42.
We cannot compare our examples’ mean inactivity durations to that implied by the Vissing-
Jørgensen data without making some assumption about the shape of the empirical hazard. If one
assumes that the probability of an active trade is constant from quarter to quarter in the data,
then the range reported above implies a mean duration of household inactivity ranging from 7.5
to 13.8 quarters. Recall that the mean duration of inactivity in our baseline example is only 4.8
quarters, while that in our second example involving high transactions costs is 7 quarters. This
again suggests that the frequencies of active trades implied by these two versions of our model are,
if anything, high relative to the data. However, our third example with both high maximum and
mean inactivity spells exhibits an average duration within the range implied by the data, at 9.55
quarters. Thus, we will study this third case as we move to examine our model’s dynamic results
in section 5.
We conﬁne our remaining discussion of the model’s steady-state to that arising under our base-
line parameters, as the qualitative aspects that we will emphasize hold across all of our examples.
Here, with both the aggregate endowment and the money growth rate ﬁxed at their mean values,
six groups of households enter into each period, with these groups corresponding to the number
of quarters that have elapsed since members’ last account transfer. As any individual household
moves through these groups over time, its real money balances available for shopping fall further
and further below the target value, 2.936, given both inﬂation and its expenditures subsequent to
its last time active. To correct this widening distance between actual and target real balances, the
household becomes increasingly willing to incur a ﬁxed transfer cost. This implies that the thresh-
old cost separating active households from inactive ones rises with households’ time-since-active.
Thus, as transfer costs are drawn from a common distribution, the fraction of households exhibiting
current activity in Table 1 rises across start-of-period groups.
10For example, in any date t of our model’s steady-state, there are θ1 households entering the period in time-since-
active group 1. After one year, at the start of period t +5 , θ1 − θ5 of that original group have undertaken at least
one trade. Thus, the fraction of them that have traded within a year is
θ1−θ5
θ1 . The overall fraction trading within
one year is the population-weighted sum of these fractions across each starting group, j =1 ,...,J.
13Table 1: Determination of steady-state shopping-time distribution
time-since-active group 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
start-of-period populations 0.208 0.205 0.196 0.174 0.136 0.082
fraction currently active 0.011 0.045 0.113 0.218 0.397 1.000
shopping-time real balances 2.936 2.510 2.095 1.691 1.301 0.929 n/a
shopping-time populations 0.208 0.205 0.196 0.174 0.136 0.082 0
In ﬁgure 1A, we plot the steady-state distribution of households across groups as they enter
shopping-time from the ﬁnal row of table 1. Corresponding to the rising fractions of active house-
holds shown above, the dashed curve reﬂecting the measures of households in each shopping-time
group monotonically declines across groups. The solid curve in the ﬁgure illustrates the ratios of
real consumption expenditure relative to real balances, individual velocities, associated with the
members of each shopping-time group. Because households are aware that they must use their
current balances to ﬁnance consumption not only in the current period but also throughout subse-
quent periods of inactivity, individual spending rates rise across groups in response to a declining
expected duration of future inactivity. Currently active households, those households in group 0,
face the longest potential time before their next balance transfer, and thus have the lowest individ-
ual velocities. By contrast, households currently shopping in group 5 will receive a transfer with
certainty at the start of the next period; thus, individual velocity is 1 for members of this last
group.
Two aspects distinguishing our endogenous segmentation model will be relevant in its responses
to shocks below. First, on average, a household’s probability of becoming active monotonically
rises with the time since its last active date, as seen above. Second, these probabilities change over
time as shocks inﬂuence the value households place on adjusting their bank balances. To isolate the
importance of these two elements below, we will at times contrast the responses in our economy to
those in a corresponding economy that has neither. In that otherwise identical ﬁxed duration model,
the timing of any household’s next account transfer is certain and is not allowed to change with the
economy’s state. Consistent with our endogenously segmented economy, where households’ mean
duration of inactivity is 4.8 quarters, households in the corresponding ﬁxed duration model are
allowed to undertake transfers exactly once every 5 quarters.
Figure 1B displays the steady-state of the ﬁxed duration model. There, households enter every
period evenly distributed across 5 time-since-active groups. Throughout groups 1 through 4,f r a c -
tion 0 of each group’s members are allowed to undertake account transfers, while fraction 1 of the
members of group 5 are automatically made active. Thus, 20 percent of households enter into
shopping in each time-since-active group 0 through 4, and this shopping-time distribution remains
ﬁxed over time. As in our model with endogenously timed household portfolio adjustments, here
too individual velocities monotonically rise with time-since-active and hit 1 in the ﬁnal shopping
group. However, given its lesser maximum duration of inactivity (5 quarters here versus 6 in the en-
dogenous segmentation model), households in the ﬁxed duration economy exhibit somewhat higher
spending rates throughout the distribution relative to those in panel A.
4.2 Money injection: a baseline example
In this and the following section, we begin our study of the endogenous segmentation economy’s
dynamics using two examples designed to illustrate its underlying mechanics. Here, we examine
the eﬀects of an unanticipated one period rise in the money growth rate.
14Fixed duration model. For reference, we begin in ﬁgure 2 with an examination of the aggregate
response in the ﬁxed duration model, where the fractions of active households across groups are
ﬁxed and dictated by αFD =[ 00001 ] .11 As seen in the top panel, the aggregate price-level rises
only halfway at the date of the money supply shock, with the remaining price adjustment staggered
across several subsequent periods. This inﬂation episode continues until those households who were
active at the shock date have traveled through all time-since-active groups and are once again active,
at the start of date 6.
The aggregate price-level adjusts gradually in this exogenously segmented markets economy for
precisely the reasons explained by Alvarez, Atkeson and Edmond (2003). Open market operations
that inject money into the brokerage accounts must be absorbed by active households.12 However,
as they will be unable to access their brokerage accounts again for 5 periods, these households
retain large inventories of money relative to their current consumption spending. As noted above,
their spending rate is the lowest among all households in the economy. Consequently, total nominal
spending does not rise in proportion to the money supply, and a rise in the share of money held
by active households leads to a rise in aggregate real balances. Equivalently, in this endowment
model, velocity falls.
Formally, in a ﬁxed duration model, given any ﬁxed number of time-since-active groups J,
aggregate velocity may be expressed as the sum of two terms, one associated with the common
velocity of currently active households and one associated with the velocities of inactive households
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From this equation, it is clear that the rise in relative money holdings of active households must
reduce aggregate velocity, so long as individual velocities do not rise much in response to the shock.
As seen in the bottom panel of ﬁgure 2,i no u rﬁxed duration example, half of the money injection
is absorbed by an initial fall in aggregate velocity. As households that were active at the time
of the shock travel through time-since-active groups in subsequent periods, their spending rate
rises, pulling aggregate velocity back up. During this episode nominal spending rises faster than
the money supply, the price level grows above trend, and aggregate real balances return to their
long-run level.
Turning to the response in interest rates shown in the middle panel of ﬁgure 2,n o t et h a tt h e
money injection causes a large, but purely transitory, liquidity eﬀect. In economies with segmented
markets, real rates are determined by the marginal utilities of consumption among active households
in adjacent periods, given that only these households can transform interest-bearing assets into
consumption. In the ﬁxed duration model, only those households that are allowed to be active at
the date of the shock experience a rise in their lifetime wealth. As a result, their consumption
rises, while the consumption of households active in subsequent dates remains unchanged, thus
explaining the large but temporary fall in the real interest rate.
11Figures in this and the subsequent section reﬂect the eﬀects of a temporary 0.1 percentage point rise in the money
growth rate. Given that our model is solved linearly, we have re-scaled all responses to correspond to a 1 percentage
point rise for readability.
12No household unable to shift assets from its brokerage account into its bank account will accept the additional
money, given the rate-of-return dominance implied by positive nominal interest rates.
15Endogenous segmentation model. Figure 3 displays the aggregate response to the same tempo-
rary shock in our model. The endogenous segmentation economy exhibits somewhat sharper initial
price adjustment, associated with a smaller fall in aggregate velocity, and it has a more protracted
response in inﬂation. Although the average time between a household’s account transfers is 4.8
periods in our model’s steady-state, its high inﬂation episode following the purely transitory money
shock lasts 8 periods. The initial decline in interest rates is substantially smaller than were those
in ﬁgure 2, at about one-tenth of the size of the money growth shock. However, in contrast to the
immediate correction seen under ﬁxed duration, the real interest rate here remains persistently low
for 6 quarters. These diﬀerences in amplitude and propagation arise from the two elements distin-
guishing our model, the nontrivial rising hazard reﬂecting the fractions of households undertaking
bank transfers from each time-since-active group, and the movement in this hazard in response
to an aggregate shock. The ﬁrst of these elements is central to our model’s larger initial rise in
inﬂation, while the second is entirely responsible for its substantially diﬀerent real interest rate
response.
Similar to (21) above, aggregate velocity in our model is determined by a weighted sum of the
individual velocities of active and inactive households, with weights determined by the measures of
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The ﬁnal term reﬂects the proportion of the aggregate money stock used in paying transfer costs,
and was absent in (21). However, as this term is quantitatively unimportant both on average and
following the shock, it cannot explain our economy’s lesser decline in aggregate velocity relative to
the ﬁxed duration model. The ﬁrst-order diﬀerence lies in the second term, the weighted velocities
of inactive households.
In the ﬁxed duration model, every household spends all of its money between any one balance
transfer and the next, because this timing is certain. By contrast, the average household in our
economy typically has some left-over money in its bank account when it undertakes its next transfer,
because this timing is uncertain. Given their ability to alter this expected left-over money, our
inactive households are more ﬂexible in responding to the money growth shock.13 In response to
the rise in anticipated inﬂation, their spending rates, vjt,r i s eb e t w e e n0.3 and 0.5 percent with the
money injection, roughly twice as much as in the ﬁxed duration model. As a result, our economy
experiences a lesser decline in the second (and largest) term determining aggregate velocity at the
date of the shock due to its nontrivial hazard. This is mitigated to some extent by changes in the
hazard, as discussed below.
Because the money injection implies an inﬂationary episode that will reduce inactive households’
real balances, it increases the value of actively converting bonds held in the brokerage account into
money. Thus, a greater than usual measure of households become active. However, this rise in the
number of active households has only limited impact in reducing aggregate velocity, since it implies











As active households have higher consumption than inactive households (and c0,t+1 rises with the money injection in
our economy), the positive and increased probability of becoming active in the next period compounds the eﬀect of
anticipated continued high inﬂation in discouraging money savings.
16that in equilibrium each active household receives a lesser share of the total money injection. As a
result, the weight
M0,t
Mt is smaller in (22) than it is in (21), which in turn implies a lesser initial rise
in the consumption of active households in our economy. The smaller rise in each active household’s
money holdings also implies that their velocity falls by less than in the ﬁxed duration model (0.4
versus 1.6 percent).
While endogenous market segmentation reduces the initial real eﬀect of a monetary shock, it also
propagates it through changes in the timing of households’ transfer activities, which are summarized
in panel A of ﬁgure 4. Following a substantial initial rise, the overall measure of active households
falls below its steady-state value for a number of periods, despite persistently high activity rates
across groups, αjt. This is because large initial rises in these rates shift the household distribution
to imply higher than usual money balances for the mean household in subsequent dates, thereby
reducing its incentive to transfer funds from the brokerage account.
Those persistent changes in the distribution of households are responsible for the persistent real
eﬀects in our economy. In dates following the shock, although money growth has returned to normal,
the measure of active households is suﬃciently below average that each such household receives an
above-average transfer of real balances in equilibrium. Thus, the rise in the consumption of active
households in our economy is not purely transitory as it was in the ﬁxed duration model. Rather,
as seen in panel B of ﬁgure 4, it returns to steady state gradually as the distribution resettles. This
explains why the initial decline in the real interest rate is much smaller in our economy relative to
the ﬁxed duration model, and why it remains persistently low.
Figure 5 veriﬁes the importance of changes in our economy’s endogenous timing of household
transfer activities by displaying the aggregate response in an otherwise identical model where such
changes are not permitted. In this time-dependent activity model, a nontrivially rising hazard
governs the timing of household account transfers; in fact, it is precisely that from our economy’s
steady-state in table 1. Here, however, this hazard is held ﬁxed throughout time. From the
comparisons in panels A and C, it is clear that changes in group-speciﬁc activity rates serve to
reduce aggregate velocity in our model economy, yielding more gradual price adjustment, as was
argued above. Next, the time-dependent model’s interest rate responses in panel B conﬁrm that our
economy’s persistent liquidity eﬀects in real rates arise entirely from changes in the hazard, rather
than its average shape. Absent these changes, the interest rate decline is completely transitory just
as in the ﬁxed duration model.
4.3 Money injection: high transfer costs examples
In the preceding example, the ﬁxed transfer costs causing our economy’s market segmentation
were selected to yield average aggregate velocity at 1.9, and implied a 4.8 quarter average duration
of inactivity among households. Here, we examine our model’s response to the same temporary
money growth shock in an example with high transfer costs implying aggregate velocity matching
the U.S. postwar average, at 1.5, and a mean inactivity duration of 7 quarters. In this case,
the maximum inactivity spell facing a household is substantially longer, at 10 quarters, and only
about 14 percent of households are active in the average period (versus 21 percent above). Thus,
households are spread across far more groups and, as a result, carry larger inventories of money on
average.
Figure 6 is the high transfer cost counterpart to ﬁgure 3. Here, in contrast to the previous
example, the aggregate price level actually rises by more than the money growth shock at its impact,
given a rise in aggregate velocity, and the inﬂationary episode is entirely temporary. Moreover,
17the persistent decline in the real interest rate of ﬁgure 3 has also evaporated. These dramatic
changes in the model’s response may be traced to two features of the mechanics discussed above
that become more pronounced when households face the possibility of very extended absence from
their brokerage accounts: the rise in activity rates at the date of the shock and, more importantly,
the rise in individual spending rates among inactive households.
With the money injection comes a permanent upward shift in the path of the aggregate price
level. This is far more costly for inactive households in this example relative to the previous one,
because these households are, at impact, holding much higher inventories of money in preparation
for longer horizons of potential inactivity. This leads to a percent rise in activity rates (4.2
percent) similar to that in our previous example with much smaller transactions costs. However,
high transactions cost draws keep most households inactive. In an eﬀort to oﬀset the fall in their
real consumption spending, these households increase their spending rates.14 As a result, the
percentage rises in vjt over time-since-active groups 1 through 5 are roughly double those in our
previous endogenous segmentation example, and these rises are also large in each of the higher-
numbered groups new to this example, at around 0.75 percent. Moreover, even with increased
activity rates, inactive households make up roughly 75 percent of all households at the date of the
shock. Thus, as these households release substantially more money into the goods market than
usual, total nominal spending actually increases by more than the money supply. This leads to
the sharp impact-date inﬂation.
There is virtually no real interest rate response at all in this example. The high current
price level, and the large change in activity rates (which have a lower steady state value in this
example), are suﬃcient to imply that each active household receives no greater percentage rise in
real money holdings than did its counterpart in our previous example. However, active households
here have signiﬁcantly lower spending rates on average (given potentially very long absences from
the brokerage accounts). As a result, their consumption rises by less than one-third the rise seen
in ﬁgure 4, remaining very close to that of households active in subsequent dates.
We have referred to our second example as one with an increased average duration of inactivity.
However, what distinguishes this example is the substantial diﬀerence between the mean duration
of inactivity (7 quarters) versus the maximum (10 quarters). This leads to additional precautionary
accumulation of money and, on average, households return to the bond market with sizeable left-
over money balances. Thus, inactive households at the date of the money injection have substantial
ﬂexibility in raising their current spending rates by reducing their expected future left-over balances.
This allows the sharp initial rises in individual velocities central in the results above. Alternative
examples where the maximum length of inactivity is similarly high, but the mean duration is close
to it, more closely resemble the baseline example in the section above. One such example follows.
To obtain a high maximum inactivity duration example where the mean duration is similarly
high, we abandon our assumption that transfer costs are distributed uniformly. In this third case, we
assume a beta distribution parameterized by [α =3 ,β=1 /3] and set the maximum transfer cost at
B =0 .50. This results in an average aggregate velocity again at 1.5, a maximum inactivity duration
of 10 quarters and a mean duration of 9.55 quarters. With this change in the cost distribution,
our model’s steady-state hazard describing average activity rates looks much like that of a ﬁxed
14As noted above, probabilistic timing of future activity is important, because it implies that, on average, most
households return to their brokerage accounts with some money remaining. At the impact of the shock, this allows
inactive households the ﬂexibility to transfer some of their current consumption loss into dates beyond that when
they will next be active. Moreover, on average, the expected money with which a household returns to the brokerage
account is higher in this example relative to the previous one, allowing greater adjustment along this margin.
18duration model, in that activity rates are near zero for all groups below J. As such, one might
imagine that its dynamic response would resemble a J =1 0version of ﬁgure 2. However, because
our households are able to change the timing of their transfers, this is not the case. In fact, ﬁgure
7 reveals that the response to the temporary money shock is instead quite similar to that in our
baseline endogenous segmentation example. Again, adjustment in the aggregate price level is slow,
resulting in a persistently high inﬂation episode and, unlike a ﬁxed duration model, the real interest
rate is persistently low. The one new feature here relative to both the ﬁxed duration model and
our baseline example is a persistent liquidity eﬀect in nominal interest rates. From this, it is clear
that the distribution of the costs responsible for market segmentation can have important eﬀects
on aggregate dynamics.
Recall that this third example also improves upon those above in its consistency with the
microeconomic evidence regarding the frequency of active trades. Here, the model predicts that,
on average, the fraction of households undertaking active trades within one year is 0.42.U n l i k e
either of the preceding examples, this prediction lies well inside the range estimated by Vissing-
Jørgensen (2002), 0.29 − 0.53. Thus, we pursue this case of high mean and maximum inactivity
duration as we examine our model’s dynamic results in the section below.
5R e s u l t s
T h ee x a m p l e sw eh a v ec o n s i d e r e dt h u sf a ra r eu s e ful in illustrating the mechanics of our model,
at least qualitatively. However, the analysis of a purely random increase in the money supply is
far from what most would view as reﬂective of inﬂation and interest rate dynamics in an actual
economy. In this section, we present results for our model under more plausible assumptions about
monetary policy. First, we examine a persistent shock to the money growth rate. Next, we consider
an environment where the monetary authority implements changes in the money supply towards
stabilizing inﬂation in the face of persistent real shocks. As we examine the resulting dynamics in
each of these cases, we will draw upon our analyses of the examples above for explanations.
5.1 Persistent money growth shock
We begin by considering the aggregate response to a persistent rise in the money growth rate,
now assuming that the money growth rate follows an AR(1) process with autocorrelation 0.57,a s
in Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2002). To see how endogenous changes in the extent of market
segmentation inﬂuence this response, we contrast our endogenous segmentation economy to its
corresponding ﬁxed duration model where such changes are not permitted.15
Figure 8 shows log deviations from the initial trend for the money stock and for the price levels
of our model and the ﬁxed duration model. The impact of the shock on the money supply is
largely ﬁnished by period 7, while the price levels are clearly more sluggish in their adjustment,
with above-average inﬂation continuing for 3 or 4 additional periods. What is noteworthy is that
the response in prices when segmentation is endogenous is more gradual. Moreover, while the price
l e v e li nb o t hm o d e l so v e r s h o o t si t sn e wt r e nd, this is less pronounced in our model.
15The response in the corresponding time-dependent model (where the hazard describing activity rates is held ﬁxed
at the endogenous model’s steady-state) is similar to that of the ﬁx e dd u r a t i o nm o d e ls h o w nh e r e . T ou n d e r s t a n d
why, recall from our discussion of ﬁgure 7 that the beta distribution from which transfer costs are drawn in our model
leads to a steady-state hazard resembling the hazard of a ﬁx e dd u r a t i o nm o d e l .
19In the ﬁxed duration model, large wealth eﬀects for households active in the early periods of
the shock lead to sharper increases in prices. By eroding the real balances of inactive households,
inﬂation redistributes consumption to active households. By contrast, in our model, rises in the
numbers of active households reduce the increase in their individual money holdings, and thus the
extent to which, in equilibrium, consumption must be redistributed. Compared to the transitory
shock studied in ﬁgure 3, since the rise in the money growth rate is now persistent, some households
delay their early return to the brokerage account by a period or two in hopes of lower transfer costs.
As a result, the rise in the number of active households is initially smaller, and it persists for several
periods, thereby protracting the distributional eﬀects of the shock. Relative to the ﬁxed duration
model, a persistently smaller redistribution of consumption from inactive to active households in
our model explains its lower rates of inﬂation in periods after the shock. Moreover, because the
early periods with above-average numbers of active households are followed by 6 periods in which
this number falls below steady-state, the episode with high real balances per active household
is extended (as discussed above in section 4.2). This implies greater persistence in the increased
consumption of active households, and a persistent liquidity eﬀect in both real and nominal interest
rates relative to the ﬁxed duration model (not shown).
5.2 Real shock under a Taylor rule
Here, we allow for shocks to the real endowment received by households, with the money supply
governed by the Taylor rule speciﬁed in section 3. Figure 9 shows our economy’s aggregate response
to a persistent rise in the endowment, alongside the corresponding response in the time-dependent
model where the hazard dictating households’ probabilities of becoming active remains ﬁxed over
time. While we do not display the response in the corresponding ﬁxed duration model, note that
our discussion of the time-dependent model below would apply equally well if we were instead
describing that model. Given similar ﬁxed hazards describing activity rates, the responses in these
two exogenous segmentation economies are quite close.
Taken on its own, in the absence of any response in the money growth rate, the rise in endow-
ments would imply a fall in the inﬂation rate to increase real balances. Given the Taylor rule, this
requires a fall in the nominal interest rate. Indeed, given the active policy rule we have assumed,
where the nominal interest rate responds by more than inﬂation, the real interest rate must fall.
In the time-dependent model there is a sharp, unanticipated fall in prices at the initial date of
the shock. Interest rates fall, and an increase in the real balances of active households ﬁnances
subsequent purchases of the increase in output. Households active after the shock do not experience
a rise in their consumption and do not require anything beyond the usual transfer of real balances
from their brokerage accounts. Thus, inﬂation returns to its average value in the second period, as
do interest rates.
By contrast, in our economy with endogenous market segmentation, there are persistent re-
sponses in inﬂation and interest rates, with a half-life of roughly 3 quarters. The fall in nominal
interest rates gives households an incentive to hold more money. The resulting rise in activity rates
implies that the increase in the money supply, relative to trend, is spread over more households
than usual, thus lowering the rise in each individual withdrawal. Relative to the exogenous segmen-
tation model, this reduces the rise in consumption among households active in date 1 of the shock.
Thereafter, with fewer households remaining in other groups at this initial date, subsequent active
populations are reduced, thereby raising their individual withdrawals. As a result, consumption
among active households rises less sharply upon the shock’s impact and is more evenly spread across
20subsequent active groups. For this reason, there is a lesser initial fall in the real interest rate, but
a gradual return to steady state thereafter. As a result, there is persistence in the nominal interest
rate that translates, through the Taylor rule, into persistently low inﬂation.
It is worth re-emphasizing that our economy’s persistent response in this ﬁgure cannot be
attributed to the Taylor rule itself, noting again that there is no such persistence in the exogenous
segmentation counterpart. Rather, it arises entirely from households’ ability to change the timing
of their portfolio adjustments in response to the economy’s aggregate state. Viewed alternatively,
it is a consequence of endogenous changes in the extent of market segmentation.
This set of results, based on empirically plausible policy rules, reinforces our view that the
eﬀort to endogenize market segmentation is a worthwhile one, indicating the promise that such
models have for explaining persistent movements in inﬂation and interest rates in actual monetary
economies.
5.3 Real shock under a Taylor rule with production
We now brieﬂy consider the joint mechanics of market segmentation, output and employment
by endogenizing production. Even abstracting from capital, this generalization is complicated by
the introduction of variable labor supply decisions. This is because we maintain consistency with
our existing assumptions with respect to risk-sharing, and this implies that households in diﬀerent
time-since-active groups choose diﬀerent hours worked.
We assume a competitive ﬁrm that hires labor from households and produces the single con-
sumption good. All households are paid the same wage. The ﬁrm is owned equally by all households,
there is no trade in shares, and all proﬁts are returned to owners. Assume that the aggregate pro-
duction function is y = zNν and that the logarithm of z follows an auto-regressive process with
persistence parameter, ρ. Households now value both consumption and leisure, and their utility
function is given by u(c,n)=
(c−ηnγ)1−σ
1−σ ,w h e r ec is consumption and n denotes hours of work.
The timing of events within a period is as follows. At the beginning of each period, households
observe the current aggregate state, draw their transfer costs, make their portfolio adjustments,
and then participate in the labor market. Fraction λ of both labor income and proﬁts are paid
into the bank account. As before, income earned this period is available at the start of the next.
Thus, there remains a cash-in-advance constraint on consumption purchases.
Given the one-period lag with which households are able to transform real wages into consump-
tion, and the fact that households continue to diﬀer in their real balances and thus consumption
spending, hours worked also diﬀer across households. Let nj, j =0 ,...,J − 1,d e n o t et h el a b o r
supplied by households in time-since-active group j. The aggregate resource condition in (20) still











(1 − αj)θjnj.( 2 3 )
Finally we assume that monetary policy follows a Taylor rule with the following speciﬁcation:
it = i∗ +1 .5[πt − π∗]+0 .35[yt − y∗].
We choose the following parameters. First, we set ν =0 .6 and the persistence of total factor
production, ρ =0 .9. Next, we choose a relatively low wage-elasticity of labor supply, at least
21when compared to values often used in macroeconomic research, setting γ =2 .5. Aggregate hours
worked in the steady-state are chosen to be approximately 1
3 of time, which requires η =2 .7.W e
maintain all other parameters of the endowment model studied in this section, where transfer costs
are drawn from a beta distribution. This, in turn, requires that we choose a steady-state level of
total factor productivity of 0.33 so as to match our previous measure of aggregate velocity without
changing the cost parameters.
Figure 10 illustrates the economy’s response following a persistent shock to total factor pro-
ductivity. As output increases with the shock to technology, there is a rise in the demand for
real balances, which, given the money supply, reduces the price level relative to its trend. The
monetary authority responds according to the Taylor rule, lowering the nominal interest rate. As
the return on bonds falls, the fraction of households actively trading bonds for money rises.
As we have now seen in several examples, this initial rise in the number of traders has dynamic
implications. In periods following the shock, the number of active households falls. This, in turn,
implies that their real balances rise above the level typically held by an active household. In
response, they increase their current consumption spending, and this drives further increases in
output and employment. As a result, we observe a non-monotone response in these series. This
arises entirely from households’ ability to choose when to trade bonds for money, and to change
the timing of these trades in response to changes in income, prices, wages, and interest rates. It
does not exist when we suppress such choices.
6C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
In the sections above, we have developed a monetary endowment economy where ﬁxed transac-
tions costs lead households to reallocate their wealth between money and interest-bearing securities
infrequently. Given these costs, some fraction of households choose not to withdraw interest income
in any given period; thus, on average, households carry inventories of money to help ﬁnance their
consumption spending over multiple periods. In this segmented asset markets environment, open
market operations directly aﬀect only a subset of all households. As a result, changes in money
growth rates are followed by gradual adjustment in the aggregate price level. Moreover, because
they disrupt the distribution of real wealth across households, such changes can have persistent
eﬀects on real interest rates.
Our approach to endogenizing market segmentation has emphasized idiosyncratic risk at the
household level, through the assumption that transactions costs vary randomly across households.
We have shown through a series of examples that the underlying distribution of these costs has
important implications for the resulting distributions of households over money holdings, and thus
the real eﬀects of monetary policy. Given this ﬁnding, we have restricted the distribution of
transactions costs to ensure consistency with both macroeconomic data on aggregate velocity, and
microeconomic data on the frequency with which households buy or sell securities. Note that it
is not essential that idiosyncratic diﬀerences across households are subsumed in their transactions
costs. We believe that similar results would be obtained if transactions costs were common across
households and idiosyncratic risk instead arose from diﬀerences in household endowments.
In our economy, small changes in the number of households actively participating in open
market operations lead to changes in the distribution of money holdings across households that
diﬀer markedly from those in existing monetary models where the degree of market segmentation
is ﬁxed. When shocks to money growth rates are transitory, these changes in distribution add
22persistence to inﬂation, and they transform sharp temporary movements in interest rates into more
moderate and gradual responses. Under persistent money growth shocks, they imply more gradual
price adjustment. When monetary policy is governed by an active Taylor rule, persistent real shocks
cause persistent movements in inﬂation and interest rates only if households are allowed to respond
to such shocks with changes in the timing of their portfolio reallocations. Finally, in versions of the
model with production, we observe a hump-shaped response in employment and output following
a persistent but monotone shock to technology.
Our ﬁndings above suggest that monetary models with endogenous market segmentation may
be useful toward a better understanding of the relations between movements in real and nom-
inal aggregate series observed in the data. Nonetheless, the environment that we have studied
here is suﬃciently stylized that it permits only limited comparison with the dynamics of actual
economies. In future work, we hope to add additional dynamic elements to the model, in par-
ticular, capital accumulation, and then evaluate the extent to which richer models of endogenous
market segmentation are useful in understanding the joint movement of real and nominal variables.
Equally immediate is the need to understand how to use microeconomic data to better determine
the appropriate distribution of transfer costs for the model. In particular, we have seen that the
aggregate predictions of the model hinge on distributions that imply relatively little time-variation
in individual trading patterns.
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 Figure 10: Employment and Production with a Taylor Rule 
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A Risk sharing
As described in the main text, bonds issued by a competitive ﬁnancial intermediary are con-
tingent on both aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks. The supply of these bonds is created using
purchases of government bonds and free entry into intermediation implies a zero-proﬁt condition.
Our ﬁrst lemma derives the equilibrium price of households’ bonds. Given the aggregate history
st, the intermediary’s proﬁt when next period’s aggregate shock is st+1 solves the problem in (8)





of nominal bonds that pay one unit of currency next period if the aggregate shock is given by st+1

























































































The last equality follows from the zero proﬁt condition.
B Characterizing household behavior under risk-sharing
This section provides the main results we use in our numerical approach to solving the model.
Lemma 2 proves that, given risk-sharing in the brokerage account, beginning of period money
balances capture all diﬀerences across households at the start of any period. Additional results in
lemma 3 establish that whenever households access their brokerage account, there is uniformity of
actions in that they choose the same consumption and bank account balance regardless of their past
history of idiosyncratic shocks. The importance of this is that any diﬀerences across households
will be limited by the number of periods since active transactions between the bank and brokerage
account. Such diﬀerences disappear whenever households with diﬀerent bank account balances
access their brokerage account at the same time. Finally, lemma 4 proves that households’ follow
a threshold rule in determining the timing of their account transfers; speciﬁcally, it shows that
households choose to become active whenever their current ﬁxed transfer cost falls below some
threshold value that is common to all households with the same beginning-of-period bank balance.
We begin by deriving a lifetime budget constraint associated with the brokerage account. Using






q(s1)h(ξ1)B (s1,ξ1)dξ1ds1.( 2 4 )
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Equation 25, which is an immediate implication of the availability of a complete set of state-
contingent bonds for each household, implies that individual histories are irrelevant beyond current
money balances in the bank account. This intuitive property of the model is straightforward, if
notationally cumbersome, to prove and is important in our approach to characterizing competitive
equilibrium.
Lemma 2 Given M
¡
st−1,ξt−1¢













dependent of the history ξt−1.

























































































































































































































































































describe these choices. Next, any solution to the house-



















































































































≥ 0,f o r j =1 ,...,t− 1.

















































We proceed to further characterize household behavior by studying the state-contingent plans
chosen by households in period 0 when they are all identical. Let Λ denote the multiplier associated
with equation 25 and ν0
¡
st,ξt¢





















































































































Given any choice of z
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=1 .( 3 1 )
The following lemma shows that households choose the same consumption and subsequent
money balances for their bank account whenever they pay transfer costs to access their brokerage
accounts. Recall that this result is important for the approach we take to characterizing household
behavior in that it implies that heterogeneity acro s sh o u s e h o l d si sl i m i t e dt op e r i o d sw h e nt h e ya r e
inactive.
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ivAs Λ is the same for all households, this proves that c
¡
st,ξt¢
is independent of ξt. Next, it is
suﬃcient to examine the case where A
¡
st,ξt¢
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Since this expression must hold for all ξt, it follows that c
¡
st+1,ξt+1¢
is not a function of ξt which,






must be independent of ξt.
Our ﬁnal result shows that households follow threshold cost policies with respect to the costs
of accessing their brokerage accounts










is a convex set bounded below by 0.







and m h A =
R
h A h(ξ)dξ.D e ﬁne ξ implicitly
using the equation
R ξ
0 h(ξ)dξ = m h A. By the Axiom of Choice there exists a 1 − 1 function










,f o re a c hξ0 ∈ e A and ξ = S (ξ0), construct an
alternate continuation plan that assigns the original continuation plan associated with ξ0 to ξ.














and so on. This
alternative plan satisﬁes (3) - (6) and is thus feasible. Moreover, by construction, it oﬀers the same
expected lifetime utility as the original plan. Any solution to the household’s problem, solving (2)
subject to (3) - (6), must satisfy (25) with equality. Since the original plan solved the household’s








































This contradicts optimality of the original plan.
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